Rationality, Educated Opinion and Peace Essay

Abstract: This paper addresses the relevance of interwar thought to the building of peace through examining the ideas of three important writers of the period: Edward Hallett Carr, Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern. The role of public opinion was under much query in the politics of the period they wrote in, and crucial to this issue are the questions as to whether the public mind is rational and capable of reason. These writers are concerned with the influence of public opinion and believe that through educating the public mind, the possibility of peace can be increased. Drawing from their ideas, this paper thus postulates that peace is a product of rationality and there is possibility of progress through education. The birth of international relations as a separate discipline was founded against the context of the interwar years, which brought about important consequences for the subsequent development of the interwar years. The tensions prior to and the subsequent devastation of the Great War forced intellectuals of the early twentieth century to seek explanations for the causes of war and to postulate measures by which another catastrophe could be prevented. The general psyche of the people exerted an influence on the direction of international studies. As David Long points out, the academic study of international affairs during this period of time possessed â€Å"a normative though not necessarily utopian interest in the avoidance of war†1. Such a trend is manifested in the trust deed of the Wilson Chair of International Politics (one of the first few schools of the discipline), which states that international politics is the â€Å"political science in its application to international relations with special reference to the best means of promoting peace between nations.†2 Woodrow Wilson, being a leading statesman at the time, presents one of the possible avenues for peace. He consciously and deliberately tied issues of foreign policy to domestic politics, giving rise to what will come to be known as the â€Å"democratic peace thesis†. Wilson advocates the belief that â€Å"popular participation, public life and opportunity for all [will be] the guarantee of peace†. Wilson believed that diplomacy and foreign policy must be taken with regard to public opinion and the public being rational would prefer peace to war.3 The crucial premise here is that public opinion matters in a democratic political system. The assumption further made is that the political leaders are sensitive to public opinion and will be susceptible to their demands. The issue of public opinion gives rise to another set of issues, and one of the foremost in this period, is the skepticism that the basic assumption of a rational public rejecting war is true. Is the public rational? Is war a rational choice? The political definition of rationality is the ability of the public to discern the options open to them, and to adopt the best option to achieve their prioritized goals. The Great War cast doubts as to whether public is necessarily aware of what their options and goals are, much less their ability to choose the best option to fit their preferred purpose. As historian A. J. P. Taylor argues that the intellectual backlash against the dehumanizing war made the interwar years an â€Å"age of intellectual and artistic activity†, where intellectuals from various fields of study question the power of man to reason.4 The devastation of war brings queries, particularly from the idealists, as to whether war can be a rational choice. Even if the assumption holds true, there is still the question as to whether public opinion has any weight on policy formulation. Given this particular context, this paper questions the foundations of Wilsonian politics. This paper will thus postulate on the influence of public opinion and the impact of rationality on the maintenance of peace by drawing from the ideas of three important writers of this period: Edward Hallett Carr, Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern. This paper will first introduce the positions of all three writers. It will then examine the fundamental assumption shared by all three writers with respect to public opinion, before expounding on their arguments on the rationality of the public and why the issue matters. The paper will then look into the possibilities of peace, and how the three concur on the issue of education. Due to source constraints, this paper will draw on secondary references to the works of the three writers, where the primary sources are not available. Carr, Angell and Zimmern Peter Wilson in Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis introduces Carr’s book as â€Å"a work which not only set the tone for subsequent discussion of inter-war thought, but also substantially shaped postwar attitudes towards it.†5 The premise for The Twenty Years’ Crisis is the critique of inter-war idealism, which Carr terms ‘utopian’6. Carr dismisses the ‘utopians’ as being unable to understand political reality and sets up a dichotomy that supposes â€Å"utopia: reality= free will: determinism= theory: practice= morality: power =universal: relative= intellectual: bureaucrat= Left: Right† 7 The dichotomy presented by Carr undermines interwar idealism, and leads, in part, to the rejection of the practical value of these theories. This dichotomy shapes subsequent debate and is consequentially identified as the polarity of realism and idealism, which will dominate international studies for the next few decades. In order to posit queries of the dichotomy, it is first necessary to expound on the assumptions that are conventionally made of either school. Brian C. Schmidt summarises the assumptions of idealism as follows : a pervasive faith in reason and rationalism, a belief in the infallibility of public opinion, the view that war was irrational, that the best way to end conflict was through education, international law, and world government, and, finally, a belief that the essential harmony of interests existed, which translated into the international doctrine of â€Å"war-does-not-pay8. Superficially, both Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern adopt such assumptions in their writings. Significantly, both Angell and Zimmern share the same devotion to one key tenet: the possibility of progress through educating public opinion and conditioning human behaviour. Their devotion to the tenet became stronger later into their careers, especially after the Second World War. The realist school of thought as represented by Carr, refutes the idealist assumptions. In particular, the realists argue that the concept of ‘power’ is central to international affairs. Carr adopts Thomas Hobbes’ argument on human nature and advances the argument that the state as a rational actor will choose to maximize its capacity for power in order to secure its survival. He argues that public opinion, even when informed, is not necessarily pacifist and that thought can be mould by political purposes. Through defining his position by rejecting and critiquing the idealists assumptions, Carr’s realist position is thus seen as the diametric opposite of the idealists. It is then necessary to redress both the ideas of Carr and the much-maligned interwar idealists, among whom are Zimmern and Angell. The choice of juxtaposing Angell and Zimmern with Carr in this paper is conscious. Both Zimmern and Angell are among the few ‘utopians’ whom Carr explicitly criticizes in The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Andreas Osiander points out that Zimmern is â€Å"still widely regarded as what Oslon and Groom have called the ‘consummate’ idealist†9, and is thus identifiable with the idealist school of thought. Yet Zimmern, as Paul Rich and Peter Wilson suggest, is considerably less adverse to Carr’s ideas than his idealist colleagues.10 Angell, on the other hand, is one of the fiercest adversaries to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, but J. D. Miller raises the argument that â€Å"Angell should†¦ be regarded less as an idealist than a far sighted realist† because of his â€Å"acute awareness† of the issues o f political reality11. The interplay of their ideas then calls to question the validity of a clear dichotomy. In essence then, this paper seek to question if the positions of these writers on the assumptions raised by Schmidt are as concrete as they appear to be. In other words, this paper examines the complexities of Carr, Angell and Zimmern’s ideas on the applicability of public opinion, rationality and possibilities of peace. On closer examination, this paper argues that despite the differences, the three share a fundamental similarity: the belief in progress. The dichotomy between the realists and idealists is permeable, and in their postulation of the long term, the arguments of Carr, Angell and Zimmern coincide. Public Opinion First and foremost, the underlying assumption that Carr, Angell and Zimmern adopt is that public opinion matters, even though their understanding of public opinion differs. Zimmern argues that â€Å"[p]ublic opinion is the lifeblood of a civilized community† but unfortunately, the majority of the peoples is guided by â€Å"caprice of ignorance, passion or greed, and the other devils if unreason.†12 The title of Carr’s inaugural speech at the University College of Wales, â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace† says much. Carr argues that public opinion can exert tremendous influence over a foreign policy issue that it feels sufficiently strongly about, using the case of the public rejection of the Hoare-Laval plan to build his case. He states that, â€Å"No nation, and least of all a democracy, can wage war unless it has the support of an overwhelming majority of its people†13. The implication of such a statement in light of guarding the peace is that insofar as the public is not in favour of war, a state and particularly a democratic state will not and cannot adopt war as a policy instrument. Angell’s Nobel Lecture, â€Å"Peace and the Public Mind†, adopts the same position, except that he argues public opinion, being misinformed and â€Å"disastrously erroneous† can lead to war. 14 Interestingly both Angell and Carr argue that public opinion is easily manipulated. Carr devotes a section to â€Å"Power over opinion† in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, suggesting that the greater proportion of public becoming conscious or involved in politics relates to the importance that the ruling elite place on propaganda as an instrument of power. The influence of propaganda rests on the premise he sets earlier in the book that the crucial contribution of realism is the idea that thought is relative to purpose. 15 For instance, nationalism, as a form of ideology, could be seen as a means by which the public can be persuaded to go to war. Similarly, Angell contends that a small militant minority is capable of appealing to the majority towards a policy that may not be in the majority’s best interests.16 Rationality Having established that public opinion has a role to play, we then move on to the crucial questions: is the public rational, and is war a rational choice? On both issues, there are significant differences between Carr and the idealists, arising from the difference in the way they interpret and infer from past and current events. Reason and rationality give rise to different outcomes for Carr and the idealists. An important observation is that Carr places more faith in reason and rationality than do the others, contrary to our earlier presupposition that it is the idealists who have a â€Å"pervasive faith in reason and rationalism.† A proper definition of what is meant by rational behaviour has yet to be provided as a premise for argument. To proceed, we adopt James Mill’s argument for the rational public opinion quoted in Carr as a guide to what rational behaviour entails: Every man possessed of reason is accustomed to weigh evidence and to be guided and determined by its preponderance. When various conclusions are, with their evidence presented with equal care and with equal skill, there is a moral certainty, though some few maybe misguided, that greatest number will judge right, and the greatest force of evidence, whatever it is, will produce the greatest impression. 17 Whereas Carr believes that the public, being self-interested, is capable of defining their goals and seeking the best possible means to achieve toward that end, he rejects Mills’ definition of rational behaviour. Mills’ definition is in turn based on the ideas espoused by Jeremy Betham who assumes that the ideal option is the â€Å"greatest good to the greatest number†. Carr argues that public opinion comes from the masses, who are for large part, neither enlightened nor educated and thus â€Å"the greatest number† need not necessarily â€Å"judge right†. He argues that Betham and Mills’ assumption that self-interest can be sacrificed for the sake of â€Å"the greatest good† to the collective is based on â€Å"some kind of intuition of what is right and cannot be demonstrated by rational argument.†18 Carr suggests, instead, that rational necessarily demands a consciousness and the ability to adjust to the balance of power existing in international affairs, which serves as a constraint on the options available. The discerning public thus does not only take into account what is right, but also what is most practical in catering to self-interest. Carr then adopts an argument that is parallel to Thomas Hobbes’. Hobbes, in Leviathan, states the fundamental law of nature as: it is a precept, or general rule of reason that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use all helps, and advantages of war Carr comments, to the same effect, that although war is undesirable, it is not possible to impose an absolute judgement that war is â€Å"always and unconditionally wrong.† The implication of Hobbes and Carr’s argument is that the public being rational favours peace. However, when the public believes that they have more to gain from war, or more to lose from not going to war, war becomes a rational and logical solution. Historically, Carr’s argument seems to find sufficient basis in the outbreak of World War I. One of the reasons contributing to the war was the increase in bellicosity, arising from rationalization of cost and benefit or cooperation and non-cooperation. Prior to the Great War, the perceived cost of non-cooperation19 had decreased. The perception was influenced by beliefs that any war would be short, a consequence of â€Å"a highly exaggerated faith in the efficacy of offensive military strategies and tactics†20 and by the system of alliances. The perception was further coloured by nationalism. Secondly the perceived gains of non-cooperation had increased. The general belief was that expansionism and offensive foreign policy was perceived to be too high, due to the general suspicion of the intentions of the other states. Given these perceptions then prevalent, European states saw it to their advantage to go to war, and in fact to initiate the war so as to reap the greate st advantage of the ground. This international game theory exemplifies in part the rational process that Carr espoused. The idealists depart greatly from Carr. Angell and Zimmern accept that Mills’ definition is greatly desired but finds it incongruent with political reality. Reus-Smit, in his essay â€Å"The Strange Death of Liberal Theory†, argues that the conflict between morality and political reality is seen by Angell as a divide between â€Å"reason and unreason†. He argues that, â€Å"If the former prevailed, there was some hope of a reconciliation between morality, defined as the well-being of all and reality, which in [Angell’s] favoured area was the incompatibility of warfare and such well-being.21† However, within the historical context, Angell believes that ‘unreason’ prevailed. Angell believes that the public mind is often irrational, because it is too easily persuaded; it does not possess sufficient information, nor the ability to process vast amounts of information when it is available and it lacks the skill to seek evidence for the variou s conclusions, as Mill points out, i.e., it cannot â€Å"see the likely results of actions.† 22 The public mind cannot compute cost-benefit-analysis, which is central to rationalization. Angell accounts for this irrationality of the public mind, stating that it arises from the â€Å"failure to apply to our international relationships knowledge which is of practically universal possession†23 In Angell’s opinion then, it is not for the lack of intellectual capacity on the part of the public that lead to the irrational behaviour, but the inability to apply knowledge. Resting on his idea of the irrational public, Angell expounds on the war and why the public’s choice to go to war is actually irrational. In his aptly named book, The Great Illusion, he puts forth a convincing argument on the futility of war on grounds of rationality and economic considerations. Angell argues that the perceived benefits of war under modern circumstances, are reduced, as victors can no longer expect to benefit as much from the spoils of war. The change is largely because goods and spoils are no longer portable (such as gold, silver, slaves, precious stones) as they had before. Goods and services are non-physical such as currency, shares, and fixed assets, and are thus not transferable wealth. As such, if states act purely in their self-interest, given the expectation not to gain from war, states would be unlikely to pursue war.24 Angell considers this line of reasoning to be simplistic and easily applicable to the conduct of international relations. Yet as the advent of World War I proves, the public is incapable of applying such rationale to political practice. Angell argues that the pervading reasons behind war, then, are irrational. Not only does war not serve to the benefit of the state concerned, better alternatives of action could be sought such as building economic relations, social interaction. Such connections can be used in persuading, as opposed to coercing, other states into behaving in the manner that is beneficial to the state concerned. Thus the argument adopted is that war is irrational, i.e. not the best-laid option, and man being irrational and susceptible to external influences, chooses to use war as a policy instrument. Andreas Osiander points out that â€Å"unlike what Carr implies, Zimmern, like Angell, was very far from seeing public opinion as necessarily a force for peace.25† Like Angell, he believes that the conflicts in the international arena, giving rise to war are resultant of intellectual, and not political failure.26 However, if Carr is to be believed, Zimmern can, in fact, be seen as being more extreme than Angell. Carr states in The Twenty Years Crisis that Zimmern is inclined towards the hypothesis that â€Å"If mankind in its international relations has signally failed to achieve the rational good, it must †¦ have been too stupid to understand that good.† Carr’s statement is not altogether justified. Although Zimmern does point out that the impediment to overcoming the obstacle towards peace is that man â€Å"are beings of conservative temper and limited intelligence27†, what he implies is that man is reluctant to adjust to present realities brought b y modernity. As a result of the inherent resistance towards change, man’s mental capacity does not adapt to the fact that previous ways of managing international relations are no longer applicable. Consequentially, public opinion cannot be trusted to be rational. Zimmern subscribes to John Stuart Mill’s argument of the â€Å"tyranny of the majority†. He argues that the ruling elite, that is, the politicians in positions of power tend to be capable of rationalization. However this intellectual minority in government is consumed by the irrational public: â€Å"for statesmen, however wise and far sighted, are limited in their policies by the public opinion and parliaments to which they are responsible.28† Angell concurs on this issue. J. D. Miller, drawing from Angell’s comments, argues that Angell too â€Å"feared the impact upon politicians of an unreasoning crowd mind, and doubted the capacity of politicians to resist it†. Both Angell and Zimmern, then, prefer that the intellectual minority be given the ability and power to lead the rest of the populace, so as to govern rational foreign policies. In this regard, Carr again differs. Whereas Carr does agree that the intellectual minority has a role to play in leading public opinion,29 he believes that the intellectual minority is however, sadly, out of touch with reality. He argues his case by drawing on the difference between intellectuals’ perceptions of the League of Nations with those of the man on the street. The intellectuals, who tend to be idealists by his definition, strive to secure and maintain peace via means of treaties, covenants and legal codifications. The general public, however, is more concerned with the practice of international affairs (as opposed to the theory.) Going by Carr’s understanding of rational behaviour to be taking into account what is right and also what is most practical in application, the intellectual mi nority is in practice less rational than the public. Change and the possibility of progress As it is, there seems to be a great divide between Carr and his two contemporaries with regards to whether man is rational. However, central to their arguments is the shared belief that history is a directional process, that is, there is the idea of constant change. Carr argues that war occurs because of the conservative reluctance to allow change to the status quo and the way to peace is to provide means of peaceful change.30 Angell and Zimmern suggest that war occurs because man has yet to come to terms with change, and that the mentality and psyche of the populace has not kept in line with international developments. As Zimmern states, â€Å"the statesmen and the peoples have not adjusted their minds to the new realities†31. The central concern with the issue of change harkens to a broader issue on which the three writers concur: the possibility of progress. The interwar context is one of pessimism. The first decade had been one of recovery and rehabilitation from the shock of the Great War and the second decade of mounting tensions and escalation to an even more disastrous war. The context in which these writers write in, therefore, begets the question of whether man can move away from destruction of war, and by what means. The three writers agree that the current situation calls for change, as present movements and measures to maintain peace are insufficient and inadequate, and are reasonably optimistic that such change can be effected. Carr notes even in 1936 that, â€Å"the cause of peace has made tremendous stride during the past fifteen years and shows his preference towards progressive history, arguing that â€Å"a sense of change as a progressive factor in history, and belief in reason as our guide for the understanding of its complexities† are crucial to the current world. Angell is of the same mind when he questions the unchangeability of human nature and argues that just as cannibalism and slavery can be systematically reduced in our society, so too can the warlike nature of man and states32. Zimmern, even when decrying the decline of international standards (which he defined as rules of behaviour) at a meeting at Chatham House in 1937 argues that the process of change allowing for pea ceful coexistence was already taking place.33 The ultimate aim of change is the maintenance of peace, which is assumed to be the preferred good, through the avoidance of war. The question that is then posited is, by what means? Carr, Angell and Zimmern propose different measures but the one pertinent to the prior argument on public opinion and rationality is their faith in education. Due to their fundamental belief that public opinion matters, it is logical to argue that if the public mind, as Angell would call it, could be trained and conditioned to favour ‘peaceful change’, then the chances of states going to war would be minimized. Angell quotes in his The Great Illusion that â€Å"Not the facts, but men’s opinions about the facts is what matters†, and making a parallel with the abolishment of witch hunts, he comments that â€Å"just as in the matter of burning witches a change of behaviour was the outcome of a change of opinion†¦ in a same way a change in the political conduct of can only com e about as a result of a change of thought†34. The way to peace then is to shape man’s perceptions about war. Given this understanding, the most basic and possibly most efficient way of bringing about this conditioned public is through education. However in his address given to Chatham House in 1931, Angell claims that the current education system does not adequately prepare the individual to make intelligent and informed inferences from the facts presented to him. He believes that the reason behind this lack in the system is that education tends to follow a tradition whereby an older generation influences and instruct the younger through a process of socialization.35 Unfortunately this tradition means that values and ideas that are taught are often unable to catch up with present realities. The educational system had also focused on provision of information, without equipping the individual with means to discern the motivations, the causation analysis, the implications et cetera behind the piece of information. According to him, â€Å"We have thought too much of the facts and too little of their meaning.† 36 Thus the socialization/education of an individual does not adequately provide him with the skill to make rational choices. Given his premise that war is irrational under any circumstances lest in defence and a rational public will therefore reject war, the skill deficiency means that man may choose to go to war due to their lack of understanding, unless the educational system can be changed. Beyond the suggestion that education shifts its focus from its informational purpose towards equipping successive generations with the skill to possess information, Angell does not however provide for how education can be otherwise structured. Zimmern elaborates on his ideal educational system in his book Learning and Leadership, which is not only designed to impart the skill of discerning information but also specifically equipped to teach students about international life. Particularly, he believes that practical experience through interaction with people from other nations will allow students to imbibe the habit of cooperation and harmonious living37. Zimmern believes that once people are given more exposure to the international arena, they will be able to understand foreigners and foreign influences better and become more acutely aware of the idea of universal brotherhood. This basic premise being established, man will be more able to understand the actions of others, less inclined to take preemptive action and to go to war. The assumption of such an argument is that people are less inclined to advocate war against a party that they share an understanding with. Education is thus seen as an instrument which can build commonality among peoples, as well as a means by which the public can be trained to be rational. In The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Carr argues for the application of reason to understanding current situations and political reality; in his later work What is History he extends the role of reason to the capacity to reform: The primary function of reason, as applied to man in society, is no longer merely to investigate, but to transform; and this heightened consciousness of the power of men to improve the management of his social, economic and political affairs by the application of rational processes seems to me one of the major aspects of the twentieth century. 38 The core assumptions here are that reason leads to progress and progress is necessarily an improvement. Remembering the key concern of the study of international relations in the interwar period, a foremost improvement of the human condition is the eradication of war. As do Angell and Zimmern, Carr believes that education was to be the tool by which such improvement can come about. However, unlike Zimmern and Angell who believe that the public has to be thought how to make rational choices in the first place, Carr believes that education can be used to shape the way the public thinks about their choices. Carr notes then that education policy must be shaped: Educators at all levels are nowadays more and more consciously concerned to make their contribution to the shaping of society in a particular mould, and to inculcate in the rising generation the attitudes, loyalties and opinions appropriate to that type of society: educational policy is an integral part of any rationally planned social policy.39 It is then assumed, that rationally, a society will be prefer not to resort to war in a conflict of interest, and a means by which this can be ensured is to design an educational system which, in the context of the interwar years, should imbue in them the moral norm that ‘peaceful change’ is the preferred means of achieving policy objectives. To put it more plainly, Carr’s ideal is using education to persuade man against the doctrine of power, providing a basis whereby a compromise between morality and power can be reached and peaceful change achieved. In his contention that thought is relative to purpose, Carr postulates that mass opinion can directed and in fact ‘mass-produced’ via ‘universal popular education’. It is imperative to note that by popular education, Carr has included the mass media.( Carr does not, however differentiate between education and propaganda in The Twenty Years’ Crisis though in What is History, he associates education with rationality and the â€Å"growing consciousness from below as well as from above of the role which reason can play†40). The application of reason and rationality therefore means that education can be used to persuade mankind against war. Instead of making an argument that war is irrational, educators can influence the public into making a conscious choice not to use war as a policy instrument. As Carr states, â€Å"I regard as of immense importance and promise the gradual extension of the area of the world’s surface within which war has been effectively been placed under the ban,† such that war is actually unthinkable41. What becomes interesting is how closely Carr mirrors the ‘utopians’ he derides. Peter Wilson, in his attempt to understand what Carr means by ‘utopian’, lists the various characteristics that Carr associates with the term. According to his analysis, all of these characteristics are † ‘progressive ideas’; and it might be therefore be concluded that the core characteristic of interwar idealism is belief in conscious, progressive change†. On this basis, Carr does not seem to be any much different, which recalls Reus-Smit’s observation quoted earlier in this paper that Carr is himself not a consummate realist. It is also possible to put forth an argument that Carr’s argument against utopianism was never meant to be an outright and unconditional rejection of the interwar theories. Conclusion Whether or not these three writers think the public mind is rational depends largely on whether they believe war can be a rational choice, and yet regardless of their perspectives on these two issues, they believe that progress towards avoidance of war can be ensured through changing human behaviour. Education policies thus become important, as they can shape the perceptions of the public and thus affect their choices, which is in turn reflected in the chosen foreign policy. However there is a point to note based on this argument set. All three writers are writing within a democratic framework and tradition, where by definition, requires that public opinion matters. Yet, public opinion is less likely to make an impact in an authoritarian state, and even in democratic states, there is the consideration of public apathy, the leaders gambling and taking risks by not going according to public opinion, et cetera. These complications bring us back to the consideration of Wilsonian politics. Woodrow Wilson professes that his aim is to make the world safe for democracy, and that democracy will bring peace. His tendency has been to look at the building and maintenance of peace from a top down approach, where the political structure and political ideological apparatus are enforced. In other words, he looks to providing a mechanism which will allow the rational public to prevent the tendencies of the militant minority from dragging the state to war. However, from the ideas of Carr, Angell and Zimmern, such a mechanism would not function effectively against war unless the public mind can be first conditioned through a fitting educational system emphasizing co-operation and peace. 1 David Long, â€Å"Conclusion: Interwar idealism, liberal internationalism and contemporary international theory†. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. p. 303, pp. 306-307. 2 Quoted in E. H. Carr’s inaugural speech in the University College of Wales. â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace† International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939). Vol. 15. No. 6. (Nov- Dec 1936), p. 846. 3 Mortimer Chambers, et al. The Western Experience Vol C: The Modern Era. pp. 892-893 4 A. J. P. Taylor, From Sarajevo to Potsdam. London: Thames & Hudson: 1966 pp. 103-106 5 Peter Wilson. â€Å"Introduction: The Twenty Years’ Crisis and the Category of ‘Idealism’ in International Relations†. David Long & Peter Wilson. (ed.) Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1995. p.1 6 Carr’s term ‘utopians’ is generally taken to refer to the idealists, though he does not clearly define who he considers to be utopians. 7 Wilson, â€Å"Introduction†, p. 12. Wilson adapted the equation from Hedley Bull, â€Å"The Twenty Crisis Thirty Years On†, International Journal, Issue 24, Vol. 4 (1969), p. 627-8. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939. New York: Harper: (1946) 1964. pp. 11-21. 8 Brian C. Schmidt. â€Å"Lessons from the Past: reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations†. International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42. p 452 9 Andreas Osiander, â€Å"Rereading Early Twentieth Century IR theory: Idealism Revisited†, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep.,1998). p. 417 10 Paul Rich, â€Å"Alfred Zimmern’s Catious Idealism: the League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth†. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. p.88; Peter Wilson, â€Å"Carr and his Early Crtics: responses to the Twenty Years’ Crisis†. Michael Cox (ed). E. H. Carr: A critical appraisal. New York: Palgrave: 2000. p. 167. 11 J. D. Miller. â€Å"Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations†. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. pp. 116, 119. 12 Alfred Zimmern, Learning and Leadership: a study of the needs and possibilities of international intellectual co-operation. London: Oxford University Press: 1928. p. 10; p. 82. 13 Carr, â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace† pp. 857-858. 14 Norman Angell, Peace and the Public Mind. June 12, 1935. http://www.nobel.se/cgi-bin/print. March 24, 2004. 15 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis. pp. 132-133; pp. 67-75 16 Norman Angell Peace and the Public Mind. para. 19 17 quoted in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. p 24. 18 Ibid. p. 26; p. 41 19 The line of reasoning here is tied to the idea of an international game theory, which due to practical constraints cannot be covered here. The argument is made in line with Robert Jervis theory on international behaviour in his â€Å"Cooperation Under Security Dilemma† World Politics. Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan, 1978), pp.167-214. 20 Stephen van Evera, â€Å"Why co-operation failed in 1914†. World Politics, Vol. 38. No. 1 (Oct, 1985). p. 81 21 Christian Reus-Smit, â€Å"The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory†. European Journal of International Law. Vol. 12. No. 3. pp. 578-9. 22 J. D. Miller. Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the public mind. London: Macmillian: 1986. pp/ 124-125. 23 Norman Angell. Peace and the Public mind. para. 17 24 Norman Angell. Europe’s Optical Illusion. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent , 1909(?)24-40; The Great Illusion:A study of the relation of military power to national advantage. London: William Heinemann 1913. pp. 26-40. 25 Andreas Osiander, â€Å"Rereading Early Twentieth Century IR theory† p. 417 26 Alfred Zimmern, Learning and Leadership. p. 11. 27 Alfred Zimmern, â€Å"The Problem with Collective Security† (ed) Q. Wright. Neutrality and Collective Security. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1936. p. 8. 28 Ibid. 29 E. H. Carr, â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace†. p. 854. 30 E. H. Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis. pp. 208-223 31 Alfred Zimmern Learning and Leadership. p. 22 32 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion. 1913. pp. 200-221. 33 Alfred Zimmern, â€Å"The Decline of International Standards†International Affiars (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939). Vol 17. No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1938), p. 21. 34 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion. P. 327 35 Norman Angell, â€Å"Popular Education and International Affairs† International Affairs (Royal Institute of International affairs 1931-1939) Vol. 11, No. 3 (May 1932), p. 323 36 Ibid, p 335-338, 338 37 Alfred Zimmern Learning and Leadership. p. 26-60 38 E. H. Carr. What is History? New York , St. Martin’s Press , 1961 p 190 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid p. 195. Propaganda is associated with the emotive and not with reason. 41 E. H. Carr. â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace†. p. 861.